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Closius: Lochner's Revenge

LOCHNER’S REVENGE: TIERED SCRUTINY AND THE
ACCEPTANCE OF JUDICIAL SUBJECTIVITY
Phillip J. Closius*

“A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds . . . .”1

I. INTRODUCTION
Lochner v. New York2 is one of the most reviled cases in Supreme Court
history.3 The Court’s repudiation of Lochner in the late 1930s is part of
the folklore students learn when they first study American constitutional
law.4 However, Lochner continues to significantly influence the modern
judicial enforcement of civil liberties in cases involving equal protection,
substantive due process, and the free speech guarantees of the First
Amendment (hereinafter referred to collectively as “civil liberties”).5 The
development of modern tiered scrutiny can best be understood by
acknowledging Lochner’s role in its creation. This Article therefore
examines the “ghost of Lochner” in the Court’s modern civil liberties
cases.6
The Lochner opinion epitomizes a system of analysis which dominated

* Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. The Author thanks Joseph S. Stephan,
University of Baltimore School of Law, May 2020, for his invaluable research assistance. The Author
also is grateful for the comments provided by Merritt J. Pridgeon after reviewing a draft of this Article.
1. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in ESSAYS: FIRST SERIES, 58, 58 (1856).
2. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
3. See Donald L. Beschle, No More Tiers? Proportionality as an Alternative to Multiple Levels
of Scrutiny in Individual Rights Cases, 38 PACE L. REV. 384, 389 (2018); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose
Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 297, 310 (1997); Nathan S. Chapman & Michael
W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L. J. 1672, 1798 (2012); Barry Friedman,
The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1383, 1385 (2001).
4. However, not everyone agrees with the vilification of Lochner. For a review of the revisionist
interpretation of Lochner, see Friedman, supra note 3, at 1386–87.
5. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987); see also Bhagwat,
supra note 3, at 304. This Article does not deal extensively with modern limitations on enumerated
governmental powers (e.g., the Commerce Clause or taxing power) or criminal rights and powers. For a
discussion of Lochner’s influence in those subject areas, see Aziz Z. Huq, Tiers of Scrutiny in Enumerated
Powers Jurisprudence, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 575 (2013). This Article only discusses three-tiered scrutiny
in the context of the equal protection, substantive due process, and the free speech component of the First
Amendment.
6. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1293 (2007); Vicki
C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094, 3126 (2015); Sunstein,
supra note 5, at 873.
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Supreme Court decision making from the 1880s until 1937.7 The
decisions in that period were influenced by a limited sense of government
and the protection of a free market, which preserved the status quo
distribution of wealth and entitlements.8 The Lochner era was an era of
judicial activism in which the Court applied its narrow view of
governmental powers to invalidate both state economic statutes through
its substantive due process rational relation test and federal economic
statutes through its limited interpretation of the Commerce Clause.
Although some have argued that Lochner and its progeny can trace its
roots back to the legal philosophy of the Founding Fathers,9 these
decisions eventually came into direct conflict with Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s (“FDR”) New Deal and the powerful political progressive
coalition that formed during the Great Depression.10
That confrontation produced the strongest political attack on the
Supreme Court in American history.11 FDR used a new invention—the
radio—to speak directly to Americans in their homes for the first time.12
He spoke out against the Court and blamed it for the country’s failure to
recover from the Great Depression. FDR’s attack eventually culminated
in his “court-packing” plan, which proposed an additional Justice be
added to the Court for every then current Justice over seventy who refused
to retire. However, in 1937, before the court-packing proposal could be
seriously considered by Congress, the Court’s decision in West Coast
Hotel v. Parrish—which came to be known as the “switch in time that
saved Nine”—was announced.13 This decision marked the death of the
Lochner era.14 However, the true importance of 1937 extends well beyond
the West Coast Hotel decision.
Between 1937 and 1941, eight of the nine members of the Supreme
Court either died or retired.15 FDR was therefore presented with an
unprecedented opportunity—the ability to appoint an entire Court in a
fairly short period of time.16 Many of the Justices he appointed served on
7. Some commentators believe Lochner’s influence was eroding before 1937. See Randy E.
Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1479, 1482 (2008); Tara Leigh Grove, Tiers of Scrutiny in a
Hierarchical Judiciary, 14 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 475, 476 (2016). This Article agrees with the majority
consensus that 1937 is a convenient date for the end of the Lochner era. See infra note 88 and
accompanying text.
8. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 877, 882, 889.
9. See Friedman, supra note 3, at 1386–87. See also infra note 146 and accompanying text.
10. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 912.
11. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
13. See Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV.
213, 215 (1991).
14. See infra notes 85–88 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
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the Court for decades.17 All of them shared FDR’s political perspectives
and were determined to increase government power—particularly federal
power—and destroy the analytic methodology of substantive due process.
They were determined to vilify Lochner and Lochnerizing forever.18
The Lochner era was criticized as being ad hoc and subjective. The
Lochner Court was perceived as enforcing its own views of social policy
to thwart the policies adopted by politically elected legislatures and was
therefore seen as activist and counter majoritarian.19 The post-1937 Court
rejected the Lochner restraints on the federal commerce power in a trilogy
of cases which effectively immunized an expansion of federal power from
judicial review.20 The same Court employed the Lochner substantive due
process rational relation test but reversed its application. The Lochner
rational relation test presumed a statute was unconstitutional and
consistently invalidated legislative activity. However, after 1937, the
same language presumed that statutes were constitutional and deferred to
legislative policy decisions.21
Lochner and its progeny implicate the appropriate role of legislatures
and the judiciary in defining the scope of modern civil rights. The
Constitution clearly envisions Congress as a guarantor of federally
granted civil rights, as evidenced by the enabling clauses of the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and the post-1937
interpretation of the Commerce Clause. Additionally, state legislatures
can protect rights consistent with federal decisions. During the Lochner
era, the Court did not demonstrate enough respect for legislative
determinations of rights. However, after Lochner, the Court exhibited an
excessive deference to legislative action. Modern legislatures delineate
rights, and the judicially created three-tiered scrutiny test respects
legislatures by weighing both the importance of the asserted legislative
purpose and the extent to which the statute promotes that purpose. The
perceived relationship between the legislatures and the judiciary during
different periods of the Court’s history has also contributed to the
development of the modern protection of civil liberties in America.
This Article argues that the Supreme Court’s post-Lochner protection
of civil liberties is best viewed in two distinct periods. The first runs from
1937 until approximately 1971 when the death of Justice Hugo Black left
an aging Justice Douglas as the only FDR appointee still on the Court.22

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
at 1484.
22.

See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
See Friedman, supra note 3, at 1386; Klarman, supra note 13, at 222.
See Friedman, supra note 3, at 1385; Sunstein, supra note 5, at 874.
See infra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Barnett, supra note 7,
See Justices 1789 to Present, SUPREMECOURT.GOV, https://www.supremecourt.gov/about
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Lochner’s reversal during this period created a different America, and its
vilification was an emotional response led by the FDR appointees who
“internalized the criticisms” of the opinion.23 In the enforcement of civil
liberties, this period was dominated by a two-tiered analysis that strictly
presumed constitutionality for almost all laws but rigidly presumed
unconstitutionality for certain types of laws. This period also saw the
expansion of the Equal Protection Clause and free speech, but refused to
acknowledge the concept of substantive due process. Finally, legal
scholars of this period prioritized the values of neutral principles,
precedence, and consistency in legal decision-making.24
The second period begins with the Burger Court in 1971 and runs to
the present.25 The 1973 opinion in Roe v. Wade revealed a Court capable
of a more dispassionate reaction to the Lochner era.26 This mature view
of Lochner enabled the Court to create the modern three-tiered system of
scrutiny. The Court also reinstituted a new substantive due process
methodology, which has expanded the modern protection of civil liberties
(hereinafter referred to as “new substantive due process” to distinguish it
from pre-1937 “old substantive due process”). The modern system has
been subjected to the same criticisms that the Court initially ascribed to
Lochner in the first period—it is ad hoc, subjective, and counter
majoritarian. However, these perceived flaws overvalue the benefits
derived from a rigid sense of precedence and consistency. The amount of
judicial subjectivity contained in the modern three-tiered test is consistent
with American legal history’s tradition of protecting civil liberties.
Despite its objectors,27 the three-tiered analysis is firmly established in
modern Supreme Court civil liberties jurisprudence. Three-tiered
scrutiny is actually the latter portion of a two-part inquiry.28 The first part
varies depending on the constitutional basis of the right being asserted. If
the Equal Protection Clause is at issue, the Court examines whether the
/members_text.aspx (last visited May 22, 2020).
23. See Klarman, supra note 13, at 222.
24. See Phillip J. Closius, Rejecting the Fruits of Action: The Regeneration of the Waste Land’s
Legal System, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 127, 145 (1995). The Courts of the first period are oddly
contradictory. While espousing the virtues noted, the cases frequently overrule many prior decisions,
especially regarding old substantive due process, criminal law, interstate commerce, and racial
classifications.
25. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
26. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
27. R. Randall Kelso, Filling Gaps in the Supreme Court’s Approach to Constitutional Review of
Legislation: Standards, Ends, and Burdens Reconsidered, 33 S. TEX. L. REV. 493, 514–16, 540–47
(1992); Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown in the Levels of Scrutiny, 45
OHIO ST. L. J. 161, 163–72 (1984); R. George Wright, What if All Levels of Constitutional Scrutiny Were
Completely Abandoned, 45 U. MEM. L. REV. 165 (2014).
28. Three-tiered scrutiny is not mentioned anywhere in the Constitution. The entire test is
judicially crafted, as were the tests of the Lochner era and the first period. See Fallon, supra note 6, at
1268.
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classification is a suspect, intermediate, or mere classification. If
substantive due process is the basis for the claim, the inquiry shifts to
whether the liberty interest being asserted is a fundamental, intermediate,
or mere right. If the free speech guarantee is being interpreted, the Court
first determines whether the content is protected, intermediate, or
unprotected.29
The second part of the tiered scrutiny analysis is the same for all civil
liberties claims.30 The test weighs the importance of the asserted
legislative purpose and its relationship to the means embodied in the
statute.31 To satisfy the highest level of scrutiny, the legislative purpose
must be important enough to be considered “compelling,” and the
statute’s means must be necessary to accomplish that compelling purpose.
The presumption that applies to the highest level of scrutiny is that the
statute is invalid. To satisfy the middle tier of scrutiny, the legislative
purpose must be important, and the means must be substantially related
to the achievement of that important purpose. This level carries no
presumption of validity or invalidity. Minimal scrutiny simply requires
that the legislative purpose be legitimate and the statute’s means
rationally relate to effectuating that legitimate purpose. This deferential
test presumes the statute is valid.32 Heightened scrutiny refers to the
highest and middle tiers of scrutiny.33
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II analyzes the development
of the same three levels of scrutiny which apply to equal protection, new
substantive due process, and free speech cases.34 Part III examines the
different methods for determining the appropriate level of scrutiny in each
of the three constitutional settings.35 Part IV discusses the values of
limited judicial subjectivity, which is embodied in modern civil liberties
analyses.36 Finally, Part V concludes by summarizing the arguments and
29. See infra notes 255–273 and accompanying text.
30. See Fallon, supra note 6, at 1269; Grove, supra note 7, at 475.
31. This Article assumes, as the Court does, that legislative purpose can be determined.
Determination of purpose by a large legislative body may, in fact, be difficult. See Bhagwat, supra note
3, at 323. The Court in applying the rational relation test will allow government litigators to speculate on
purpose. See U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 355.
32. See Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 314–19 for a review of the modern Court’s evaluation of
legislative purpose.
33. The terms consistently used in this Article to describe the three levels of scrutiny are the ones
used most frequently by the Court and constitutional scholars. See Michael Herz, Nearest to Legitimacy:
Justice White and Strict Rational Basis Scrutiny, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1329, 1367 (2003); Fallon, supra
note 6, at 1273–74. However, the Court in not always consistent in the use of these terms and occasionally
will not use them at all. See G. Edward White, Historicizing Judicial Scrutiny, 57 S.C. L. REV. 1, 2 n.2
(2005) (“Court opinions often do not openly acknowledge the scrutiny levels decision but instead merely
employ a particular doctrinal framework associated with the level.”).
34. See infra Part II.
35. See infra Part III.
36. See infra Part IV.
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analysis set forth in this Article.37
II. THE MATURATION OF THE TIERED SCRUTINY TEST
In modern constitutional law, the Supreme Court applies the same test
in cases involving equal protection, new substantive due process, and free
speech issues.38 The second part of the test, which weighs the legislative
purpose and analyzes the relationship between the statute’s means and
that purpose, derives from Lochner’s test and aftermath.
A. The Lochner Era (1880s–1937)
The modern tiered scrutiny test traces its roots to the 1819 case
McCulloch v. Maryland.39
McCulloch dealt with the federal
government’s power to create a national bank.40 In his opinion
delineating the scope of the federal government’s Article I, Section 8
powers, Justice Marshall stated: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within
the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which
are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with
the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”41 Marshall
therefore created the “means/ends” analysis early in the history of
American constitutional law.42
Nearly a century later, the Lochner Court incorporated the McCulloch
test into its old substantive due process analysis:
The act must have a more direct relation, as a means to an end, and the end
itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act can be held to be
valid which interferes with the general right of an individual to be free in
his person and in his power to contract in relation to his own labor.43

The New York statute at issue in Lochner prohibited bakers from working

37. See infra Part V.
38. See infra notes 107–137 and accompanying text.
39. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
40. Id. at 322–23.
41. Id. at 421.
42. See id. The “means/end” test was first popularized by Alexander Hamilton during his dispute
with Thomas Jefferson over the validity of the First Bank of the United States. See ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, Opinion as to the Constitutionality of the Bank of the United States (1791), in MELVIN I.
UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL & LEGAL HISTORY 133,
135 (3d ed., vol. I 2008) (“To designate or appoint the money or thing in which taxes are to be paid, is not
only a proper but a necessary exercise of the power of collecting them.”). The power of Congress to
create the First Bank was never decided by the Supreme Court. LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING AMERICA: INSTITUTIONAL POWERS AND CONSTRAINTS 147
(10th ed. 2020).
43. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57–58 (1905).
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more than sixty hours per week or more than ten hours per day.44 The
state defended the statute as both a labor regulation and health law.45 The
Court dismissed the labor argument because the statute intruded into a
private relationship, an illegitimate end of government.46 Such a purpose
“involves neither the safety, the morals, nor the welfare, of the public, and
that the interest of the public is not in the slightest degree affected by such
an act.”47 The Court’s belief in the limited role of government and the
priority of the free market therefore dictated its holding that any
regulation of labor was beyond a state’s regulatory police power.
The Lochner opinion did concede that the state’s asserted interest in
the health of the bakers and public was a legitimate legislative purpose.48
However, the means employed by the statute—establishing daily and
weekly maximum working hours—was not rationally related to
effectuating that asserted health purpose.49 “It is manifest to us that the
limitation of the hours of labor . . . has no such direct relation to, and no
such substantial effect upon, the health of the employee, as to justify us
in regarding the section as really a health law.”50 The Court noted that a
health concern would justify the state in regulating matters such as
plumbing, painting, drainage, and the number of bathrooms per baker.51
The Court concluded that the utilization of an irrational means meant that
the purpose asserted was not really the legislature’s motivation. Rather,
New York used health to disguise its real motive—“to regulate the hours
of labor between the master and his employees (all being men, Sui juris),
in a private business, not dangerous in any degree to morals, or in any real
and substantial degree to the health of the employees.”52 In such
circumstances, the freedom to contract was protected by the Constitution;
thus, the interfering statute was invalidated.53
The Lochner era utilized its version of the rational relation test to
invalidate federal and state legislation which interfered with the natural
law rights protected by old substantive due process. The right to contract
and the right to an occupation highlighted in Lochner itself were the ones
most frequently used to invalidate progressive laws passed by state
legislatures.54 During the same era, the Court employed a narrow
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 57.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 62.
See id. at 64.
Id.
See id. at 61–62.
Id. at 64.
Id.
See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
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interpretation of the word “interstate” in Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution to invalidate progressive federal legislation based on the
Commerce Clause.55
During this period, America itself was changing radically. The advent
of the Industrial Revolution produced massive factories and sweat shops.
Monopolistic corporations established a national presence beyond the
regulatory power of any individual state. Immigrants came to America,
which led to the abundance of labor that made sweat shops possible.56
However, immigration also provided a new wave of voters, as immigrants
became citizens. These new voters demanded that the government
regulate businesses and owners (e.g., by establishing minimum wage and
overtime standards and legalizing union activity) to counter employers’
leverage in free market bargaining.57
The Lochner era was founded on a belief in a limited role of
government in regulating private affairs and the maintenance of the free
market status quo distribution of wealth.58 These two principles would
ultimately clash with a newly formed Democratic political supermajority
founded primarily on immigrants and the unemployed.59 The conflict was
foretold by Justice Holmes in his Lochner dissent: “[t]he 14th
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics. . . . I
think that the word ‘liberty,’ in the 14th Amendment, is perverted when
it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion . . . .”60
The Lochner era also revealed tensions in America still present today—
rich versus poor, Republican (party of businesses and employers) versus
Democrat (party of immigrants and employees), free market capitalism
versus socialism, and small government versus big government. The
Lochner opinion was controversial even during the era it dominated,
especially in the post-Depression period.61 These tensions erupted when

55. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495, 550–51 (1935).
56. See Charles Hirschman & Elizabeth Mogford, Immigration and the American Industrial
Revolution from 1880 to 1920, 38 SOC. SCI. RES. 897 (2009) (“The size and selectivity of the immigrant
community, as well as their disproportionate residence in large cities, meant they were the mainstay of
the American industrial workforce.”). Furthermore, “[i]mmigrants and their children comprised over half
of manufacturing workers in 1920, and if the third generation (the grandchildren of immigrants) are
included, then more than two-thirds of workers in the manufacturing sector were of recent immigrant
stock.” Id.
57. See MARK D. BREWER & L. SANDY MAISEL, PARTIES AND ELECTIONS IN AMERICA: THE
ELECTORAL PROCESS 41 (9th ed. 2020).
58. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 877, 882.
59. See Friedman, supra note 3, at 1387.
60. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes believed
that the distribution of wealth and entitlements was purely political and should be modified by legislative
implementations of distributive justice. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 918.
61. See Friedman, supra note 3, at 1388.
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the Court encountered the New Deal’s legislative reforms.62
B. 1937 and the Repudiation of the Lochner Era
The Wall Street Crash of 1929 (“the Crash”) started the Great
Depression. Republican presidents had been in power since 1920 and
appointed eight Supreme Court Justices between then and 1932.63 At the
time of the Crash, the stock market was subject only to minimal,
ineffective regulation.64 The speculative investments and corrupt
practices which spurred the Crash wiped out the individual stock accounts
of many average Americans who invested in the market during the
1920s.65 The resulting Great Depression also caused many Americans to
lose their bank savings accounts, jobs, and homes.66 By 1932, with no
end to the Great Depression in sight, the electorate was angry and
Democratic.67 A large majority of Americans elected FDR and a
Democratic Congress on the promise of a legislative New Deal, which
would lift the country out of the Great Depression caused by the
Republicans.68 Democratic majorities also dominated newly elected state
legislatures.69
The New Deal’s implementation depended on a major expansion of the
federal government’s power. The New Deal’s legislative agenda
provided for national regulation of virtually the entire economy—a task
which appeared beyond the reach of any particular state. Minimum wage,
62. See Fallon, supra note 6, at 1286–87; Klarman, supra note 13, at 222; Shaman, supra note 27,
at 161.
63. President Harding appointed four Justices, President Coolidge appointed one, and President
Hoover appointed three Justices.
Justices 1789 to Present, SUPREMECOURT.GOV,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx (last visited May 22, 2020).
64. See Paul Krugman, Partying Like It’s 1929, NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 21, 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/21/opinion/21krugman.html (“This banking crisis of the 1930s
showed that unregulated, unsupervised financial markets can all too easily suffer catastrophic failure.”);
Steven Melendez, Effects of the Stock Market Crash, ZACKS (Mar. 13, 2019),
https://finance.zacks.com/effects-stock-market-crash-7707.html; SEC: Securities and Exchange
Commission, HISTORY (Dec. 6, 2019), https://www.history.com/topics/us-government/securities-andexchange-commission (“Prior to the creation of the SEC, so-called Blue Sky Laws were on the books at
the state level to help regulate securities sales and prevent fraud; however, they were mostly ineffective.”).
65. See BRENDA LANGE, THE STOCK MARKET CRASH OF 1929: THE END OF PROSPERITY 4–6
(2007).
66. See id.
67. See BREWER & MAISEL, supra note 57, at 41.
68. See id.
69. Rob Oldham & Jacob Smith, Wave Elections (1918–2016) / State Legislative Waves,
BALLOTPEDIA (June 19, 2018), https://ballotpedia.org/Wave_elections_(1918-2016)/State_legislative
_waves. In fact, the election of 1932 produced the largest loss in state legislative seats against the
president’s party in the past century—with outgoing President Herbert Hoover’s Republican party losing
1,022 state legislative seats. Id. From 1918–2016, “[t]he median number of seats lost by the president’s
party is 82. The average number of seats lost is about 169.” Id.
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overtime, securities regulations, banking rules, and the creation of federal
agencies with oversight responsibilities were all contained within the
New Deal proposals.70 The New Deal envisioned a federal government
vastly different from the one that had existed between 1789 and 1932.71
The Lochner Court invalidated numerous attempts by both federal and
state governments to regulate the economy and implement the progressive
agenda that formed the basis of the New Deal.72 With the Depression
persisting, FDR blamed the Court for the continuation of the shattered
economy.73 FDR and the Democrats were reelected with an even larger
majority in 1936.74 This emboldened FDR even more in his attacks on
the Court.
Fortified by this popular mandate, FDR proposed his court-packing
plan to Congress on February 5, 1937.75 The proposal stated that the
President, with the consent of the Senate, would appoint a new judge to
any federal court in which a judge who had served at least ten years on
the bench had not retired within six months of reaching age seventy.76 In
1937, six Supreme Court justices were over the age of seventy. In his
message to Congress transmitting the plan, FDR attacked the Justices
directly: “at the present time the Supreme Court is laboring under a heavy
burden. . . . This brings forward the question of aged or infirm judges—a
subject of delicacy and yet one which requires frank discussion.”77 FDR
further argued that “[m]odern complexities call also for a constant
infusion of new blood in the courts, just as it is needed in executive
functions of the Government and in private business.”78

70. See New Deal, ENCYLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/New-Deal
(last visited Feb. 6, 2022).
71. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 912.
72. Scholars have estimated that the Court in the Lochner era invalidated approximately 200
regulatory statutes. See Klarman, supra note 13, at 221. Similar regulations were invalidated by state
courts in the 1930s. See, e.g., Bramley v. State, 2 S.E.2d 647, 651 (Ga. 1939) (“[U]nless an act restricting
the ordinary occupations of life can be said to bear some reasonable relation to one or more of these
general objects of the police power, it is repugnant to constitutional guaranties and void.”); Regal Oil Co.
v. State, 10 A.2d 495, 499 (N.J. 1939) (“The regulation signs can accomplish but one thing and that is to
deny prosecutor its guaranteed right to engage in its lawful private business. Such a result is fatal.”).
73. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
74. See Andrew Glass, FDR Wins a Second Term, Nov. 3, 1936, POLITICO (Nov. 3, 2018, 6:41
AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/11/03/fdr-wins-a-second-term-nov-3-1936-955317 (“In
seeking a second term, FDR won the highest share of the popular and electoral vote since the largely
uncontested election of 1820.”).
75. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress on the Reorganization of the Judicial Branch
of the Government, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu
/documents/message-congress-the-reorganization-the-judicial-branch-the-government (last visited May
3, 2020).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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FDR also effectively used the radio to direct public anger towards the
Court and energize support for his court-packing plan. His radio address
to the nation on March 9, 1937, summarized his vitriol toward the Court:
I want to talk with you very simply about the need for present action in this
crisis—the need to meet the unanswered challenge of one-third of a Nation
ill-nourished, ill-clad, ill-housed. . . . When the Congress has sought to
stabilize national agriculture, to improve the conditions of labor, to
safeguard business against unfair competition, to protect our national
resources, and in many other ways, to serve our clearly national needs, the
majority of the Court has been assuming the power to pass on the wisdom
of these acts of the Congress—and to approve or disapprove the public
policy written into these laws. . . . We have, therefore, reached the point as
a nation where we must take action to save the Constitution from the Court
and the Court from itself. . . . This plan will save our national Constitution
from hardening of the judicial arteries.79

As the attacks from an unprecedentedly popular FDR continued on a
personal level, the political pressure on the Court reached historic heights.
In 1937, the Court released two opinions which signaled the end of the
Lochner era. The first, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, was an old
substantive due process attack on a state minimum wage statute for
women.80 By a vote of 5–4, the Court changed its interpretation of the
rational relation test:
The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty
and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of law. In
prohibiting that deprivation, the Constitution does not recognize an
absolute and uncontrollable liberty. . . . Liberty under the Constitution is
thus necessarily subject to the restraints of due process, and regulation
which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests
of the community is due process.81

The opinion also reflected the progressive political beliefs held by FDR
and the Democratic party:
There is an additional and compelling consideration which recent
economic experience has brought into a strong light. The exploitation of a
class of workers who are in an unequal position with respect to bargaining
power and are thus relatively defenseless against the denial of a living wage
is not only detrimental to their health and well being, but casts a direct

79. Franklin D. Roosevelt, A “Fireside Chat” Discussing the Plan for Reorganization of the
Judiciary, 1937 PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT (Mar. 9, 1937). See also
March 9, 1937: Fireside Chat 9: On “Court-Packing”, MILLER CENTER, https://millercenter.org/thepresidency/presidential-speeches/march-9-1937-fireside-chat-9-court-packing (audio recording of
President Roosevelt’s address) (last visited May 6, 2020).
80. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
81. Id. at 391.
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burden for their support upon the community. . . . The community is not
bound to provide what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable employers.
The community may direct its law-making power to correct the abuse
which springs from their selfish disregard of the public interest.82

The Court directly overruled the earlier case Adkins v. Children’s
Hospital but effectively overturned Lochner and its premise of the limited
power of government.83 As noted by the West Coast Hotel dissent, the
concept of “unconscionable employers” was not grounded in previous
Supreme Court opinions and was inconsistent with the idea of a free
market economy.84
The 1937 case N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. was yet
another case that signaled the demise of the Lochner era.85 Jones was the
first in a trilogy of cases that dramatically reversed the Lochner era’s
interpretation of the Commerce Clause.86 Federal power was expanded
forever.
Although a minority of commentators disagreed with
characterizing 1937 as the end of the Lochner era,87 the West Coast Hotel
and Jones opinions support the majority of commentators’ assertion that
Lochner’s influence ended then.88
In 1937, the unusually high number of vacancies on the Supreme Court
also support that this year marked the end of the Lochner era and was
pivotal in American constitutional history. Since a total of seven Justices
died or retired between 1937 and 1941,89 FDR was able to appoint an
almost entirely new Court in less than four years.90 As a result, many of
82. Id. at 399–400.
83. West Coast Hotel would forever be remembered as the “switch in time that saved the Nine.”
See Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Did A Switch in Time Save Nine?, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 69, 70
(2010). The phrase refers to Justice Roberts joining the five-Justice majority opinion. See id.; supra note
81 and accompanying text. Some scholars have objected to this unfair characterization of his vote. See
Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 313 (1955) (“It is one of the most ludicrous
illustrations of the power of lazy repetition of uncritical talk that a judge with the character of Roberts
should have attributed to him a change of judicial views out of deference to political considerations.”);
Alan C. Kohn, A Legal Essay: The Judicial Activism Myth, 67 J. MO. B. 106, 109 (2011) (“Available
evidence suggests, however, that Justice Roberts’ switch was not caused by the court-packing scheme. He
had made up his mind to desert the Four Horsemen and join Hughes, Brandeis, Stone and Cardozo as
early as December 1936, when he voted to hear West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.”).
84. See West Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 405–07 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
85. N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
86. See also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941).
87. See supra note 7.
88. 1937 is the year accepted by most scholars as the end of the Lochner era. See Suzanne B.
Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 525 (2004). See also Fallon, supra note 6, at
1287; Klarman, supra note 13, at 222; Sunstein, supra note 5, at 878.
89. Justices 1789 to Present, SUPREMECOURT.GOV, https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/
members_text.aspx (last visited May 22, 2020).
90. See id. FDR replaced Justices Van Devanter, Sutherland, Cardozo, Brandeis, Butler,
McReynolds, and Chief Justice Hughes. Id. “Van Devanter timed his retirement announcement for the
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those Justices served for decades on the Supreme Court and became
figures of legendary influence: Hugo Black (1937–1971), Stanley Reed
(1938–1957), Felix Frankfurter (1939–1962), William Douglas (1939–
1975), Frank Murphy (1940–1949), James Byrnes (1941–1942), and
Robert Jackson (1941–1954).91 These Justices were aligned with FDR’s
New Deal philosophy and were committed to expanding the federal
government’s power. They also disavowed Lochner and old substantive
due process. FDR’s criticism of the Lochner era—that it involved
decision making that was ad hoc, subjective, and protective of the wealthy
status quo, substituting the Court’s preferred social policies for those of
the legislature—became entrenched in Supreme Court opinions and
scholarly literature.92
C. The Beginnings of Tiered Scrutiny (1937–1971)
The era between 1937 and 1971 (the “first period” of the modern
protection of civil liberties) reflects the influence of the FDR judicial
appointees.93 The Court’s decisions during this period evince the
emotional reaction to the Lochner era that dominated the FDR
presidency.94 The Court overwhelmingly deferred to the social policies
of the democratically elected federal and state legislatures. Particularly
in economic matters, the Court established a role of minimal
constitutional oversight.95 Government powers were perceived as broad,
and the reach of the federal government’s authority under the Commerce
Clause was virtually limitless.96 Old substantive due process was reviled
as the manifestation of an aged Court subjectively substituting its
outdated values for the decisions of a majoritarian electorate.97 The Court
continued to apply the rational relation test but with the opposite
morning of the day on which the Senate Judiciary Committee was to vote on the court-packing plan. His
announcement helped persuade some members of the committee that the Court need not be packed.”
Richard K. Neumann Jr., The Revival of Impeachment as a Partisan Political Weapon, 34 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 161, 243 (2007).
91. Justices 1789 to Present, SUPREMECOURT.GOV, https://www.supremecourt.gov
/about/members_text.aspx (last visited May 22, 2020).
92. See Klarman, supra note 13, at 221–22.
93. Justices Black and Douglas served on the Court for thirty-four and thirty-six years respectively.
Justices 1789 to Present, SUPREMECOURT.GOV, https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members
_text.aspx (last visited May 22, 2020).
94. This Article does not examine in detail all of the relevant cases in the development of threetiered scrutiny. A number of others do so fully and there is no reason to repeat them all here. See Barnett,
supra note 7, at 1481–95; Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 326–55; Fallon, supra note 6, at 1273–84; Klarman,
supra note 13, at 251–316; Shaman, supra note 27, at 163–72; Sunstein, supra note 5, at 873–902.
95. See Shaman, supra note 27, at 161.
96. From 1937–1995, the Court did not impose any significant limits on the reach of federal power
embodied in the Commerce Clause. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553 (1995).
97. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 874.
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presumption than before—statutes were now presumptively valid rather
than invalid.98
However, the seeds of dissatisfaction with the deferential model in civil
liberties cases were planted early in this period. The decision in United
States v. Carolene Products Co. validated a congressional statute
regulating the quality of milk shipped in interstate commerce.99 The
opinion is a model for the coming era of deference:
Even in the absence of such aids, the existence of facts supporting the
legislative judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting
ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional
unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of
such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some
rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.100

The opinion, however, is known for the most consequential footnote in
American constitutional history—footnote 4 states:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments,
which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the
Fourteenth. . . . It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which
restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring
about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting
judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment than are most other types of legislation. . . . Nor need we
enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes
directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities[;] whether
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.101

The Carolene Products footnote inspired the civil liberty protections of
this first period. The second sentence inspired the decisions by which
most of the first ten Amendments were incorporated into the
Fourteenth,102 the third sentence persuaded the Court to enter the field of
legislative apportionment,103 and the final sentence led to the modern
application of the Equal Protection Clause.104 However, even the

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See Barnett, supra note 7, at 1481.
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
Id. at 152.
Id. at 152 n.4.
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). The Equal Protection Clause has been
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footnote was clear that the rational relation test would not be revived in
the context of protecting civil liberties. The modern protection of civil
liberties would require the language of an entirely new test.
The Carolene Products footnote laid the foundation for the two-tiered
system of analysis that dominated this period. Substantive due process
could not be the basis of this new system because the Court still rejected
it as part of its intense anti-Lochner bias. The new “heightened” scrutiny
was therefore developed in equal protection105 and free speech106 cases.
By the end of the first period, the Court established a clear two-tiered
system for equal protection and free speech cases.107 In equal protection
cases, certain classifications (particularly those based on race or a wealthbased classification of certain “fundamental rights”) were constitutionally
suspect. In free speech cases, certain types of expression—such as
political opinions—were considered preferred speech. In both situations,
the test employed did not mirror, but was derived from, the rational
relation test. The Court still evaluated the purpose of the legislation, but
the purpose needed to have heightened importance rather than mere
legitimacy. If the purpose was found to have heightened importance, the
Court would then analyze the means by which the statute effectuated that
purpose. The test required that the means be more than merely rationally
related to the purpose.108 Despite its antipathy to Lochner, the first period
Court retained the essential structure of the Lochner test—examine
legislative purpose and critique statutory means.109 The Courts simply
intensified the language of the rational relation test.110
The two-tiered system also contained presumptions. The presumption
for the heightened scrutiny test was that the statute was invalid, while the
presumption for the rational relation test was that the statute was valid.
However, the presumptions during this period were effectively

described as the analytical repudiation of Lochner. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 913.
105. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (“necessary to promote a compelling
governmental interest”); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (“constitutionally suspect”);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“suspect” and “most rigid scrutiny”); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (“strict scrutiny”).
106. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (“compelling state interest”); Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958) (“compelling interest”).
107. For a more detailed history of the development of the two-tiered system, see Bhagwat, supra
note 3, at 304–07; Fallon, supra note 6, at 1273–84.
108. Although some opinions of the first period used the word “compelling” to describe the level
of importance required for legislative purpose, the Court was not consistent in its use of the term. The
description of the relationship of the means to the purpose was also inconsistent. The Court would also
use terms such as strict scrutiny, suspect, most rigid scrutiny, or heightened scrutiny. See supra notes
105–106. This Article generally refers to the first period’s non-deferential test as heightened scrutiny.
109. See Friedman, supra note 3, at 1416.
110. See Barnett, supra note 7, at 1487; Fallon, supra note 6, at 1273–84.
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irrebuttable.111 The heightened scrutiny test was essentially never
satisfied; the rational relation test was inevitably deferential. 112 The
highest level of scrutiny was famously described as “‘strict’ in theory and
fatal in fact.”113
The two-tiered system served many of the first period Court’s goals.
The Carolene Products footnote effectuated the heightened scrutiny test,
which also reflected the Court’s anti-Lochner bias.114 However, the
rational relation test was still the methodology of deference. The
presumptive invalidity of the heightened scrutiny test and the presumptive
validity of the rational relation test both appeared to be objective and not
subjective. Decisions were not ad hoc—legislative restrictions based on
certain classifications or certain expressions were always invalid while
others (the majority) were always valid.115 The two tier test therefore
seemingly avoided the “counter-majoritarian difficulty” posed by the
Lochner era and potentially the Carolene Products footnote.116
D. The Modern Tiered Scrutiny Test (1971–Present)
The era from 1971 to the present (the “second period”) begins with the
influence of the FDR appointees waning from the Court.117 Roe v. Wade,
the first major civil liberties decision of the period, revealed a different
attitude toward Lochner.118 Although well-known for its abortion
holding, the opinion is also critical in the creation of the modern threetiered system’s evolution. In its legal analysis, the Court stated that it felt
that “[t]his right of privacy” is “founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s
concept of personal liberty . . . .”119 This simple phrase revealed an
acceptance of Lochner that had been absent from Supreme Court opinions
for the past thirty-six years. The Court in Roe restored substantive due
process (“new substantive due process”) as a viable constitutional
methodology. Roe also confirms Lochner’s holding that rights, including
the right to privacy at issue in Roe, are not absolute. The Court then
111. See Barnett, supra note 7, at 1485, 1496.
112. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test that Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 784 (2007); Shaman, supra note 27, at 162.
113. See Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972); Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 307.
114. See Jackson, supra note 6, at 3126.
115. See Shaman, supra note 27, at 162.
116. See Barnett, supra note 7, at 1486; Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 326; Fallon, supra note 6, at
1270.
117. The death of Justice Black in late 1971 left an aging Justice Douglas as the only FDR appointee
left on the Court. Justices 1789 to Present, SUPREMECOURT.GOV, https://www.supremecourt.gov
/about/members_text.aspx (last visited May 22, 2020).
118. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
119. Id. at 153.
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incorporated the two-tiered test into the new substantive due process
system. Ultimately, Roe held that the right of privacy may only be
infringed by legislation which reveals a compelling state purpose and
whose means are necessary to the accomplishment of that purpose.120
Roe then revealed a further break with the first period Court’s
methodology by announcing that legislation can actually satisfy the
compelling interest test. Texas argued that its ban on abortions was
justified by its interests in maternal health and the potential life of the
fetus. The Court ruled that the state’s interest in maternal health becomes
compelling at the end of the first trimester.121 However, the Court found
that the state’s chosen means —a total ban on abortions—was not
necessary to accomplish such an interest. The state was only permitted to
impose regulations more directly related to maternal health, such as
qualifications for individuals performing abortions or standards for
abortion facilities. The second interest, the potential life of the fetus,
satisfied the compelling interest test at the end of the second trimester.122
The Court found a total ban on abortions was valid at that point because
it was the only means available to effectuate the interest in potential
life.123
Roe therefore altered the effectively irrebuttable presumption of
invalidity from that employed by the first period Court. The presumption
employed in its earlier version was in fact illusory—the statutes at issue
were almost always invalidated.124 Roe created a presumption that was
more consistent with the traditional use of the term—an occasionally
rebuttable presumption in which most statutes infringing on certain rights
would be invalidated, but the legislature could satisfy the standard in a
small minority of cases. The Roe decision did not directly analyze the
rational relation test's deferential presumption, but it certainly implied that
the presumption of validity would be transformed into an occasionally
rebuttable presumption.125
The modified two-tier system established in Roe also revived the anti120. For a more involved description of the development of the compelling purpose/necessary to
the accomplishment of test, see Fallon, supra note 6, at 1321–27.
121. This date was selected because medical data available at that time revealed that the end of the
first trimester was the point at which the abortion was more dangerous to the mother’s health than going
to term. Roe, 410 U.S. at 149, 163.
122. This date was chosen because medical data available indicated this was the point at which the
fetus was viable, that is able to live outside the mother’s womb, albeit with artificial assistance. Id. at
149–50, 163–64.
123. The “necessary to the accomplishment” test for evaluating the fit between the means and the
purpose in the second period’s highest level of scrutiny would be defined as the “only” way to accomplish
the purpose. See Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 301; Fallon, supra note 6, at 1326.
124. The statutes were invalidated almost every time, disregarding the repudiated holdings in
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) and Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
125. See Todd W. Shaw, Rationalizing Rational Basis Review, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 487, 498 (2017).
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Lochner critique of judicial subjectivity. Dissenting, Justice Rehnquist
noted:
As in Lochner and similar cases applying substantive due process standards
to economic and social welfare legislation, the adoption of the compelling
state interest standard will inevitably require this Court to examine the
legislative policies and pass on the wisdom of these policies in the very
process of deciding whether a particular state interest put forward may or
may not be ‘compelling.’126

Roe’s delineation of the moment when a state’s purpose became
compelling was a type of judicial balancing rooted in Lochner.127
Shortly after Roe, the Court extinguished the old two-tier system in
Craig v. Boren.128 Craig involved an equal protection challenge to an
Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to men under twentyone and women under eighteen.129 The issue was whether gender
discrimination would be subjected to the compelling or rational relation
test. The Court decided that it was subject to neither and instead created
a third level of scrutiny—intermediate scrutiny.130 The test for
intermediate scrutiny, which is effectively middle tier scrutiny, still
examined state purpose and statutory means, but both inquiries were
linguistically averaged from the other two levels—the state’s purpose
must be important, and the means must be substantially related to the
effectuation of that important purpose.131 The new middle tier scrutiny
would not have a presumption of validity or invalidity. The Craig opinion
concluded that the statute at issue failed to satisfy the new intermediate
standard.132 The intermediate standard had been foreshadowed by Justice
Marshall from his dissent in the 1973 decision in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, which critiqued the rigidity of
the first period Court’s two-tiered scrutiny.133
The addition of intermediate scrutiny completed the judicial
framework for the modern protection of civil rights. This third tier of
scrutiny was created in part to provide more flexibility in judicial analysis
than the two-tier system previously allowed.134 The new third tier of
126. Roe, 410 U.S. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
127. See Friedman, supra note 3, at 1416.
128. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
129. Id. at 191–92.
130. See id. at 197–99.
131. See id. at 197 (“To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that
classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related
to achievement of those objectives.”).
132. See id. at 204.
133. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98–99 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
134. See Jackson, supra note 6, at 3127.
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scrutiny was quickly applied to new substantive due process and free
speech. Three-tier scrutiny has become a staple of the Court’s civil
liberties methodology in the almost fifty years since Craig.135 In fact,
much recent litigation and scholarly literature on the subject have
assumed the framework and focused particularly on the first part of the
analysis, which concerns the classifications, rights, or content that should
be slotted into each level of scrutiny.136
Nevertheless, the judiciary’s acceptance of the test has not lessened
anti-Lochner criticisms.137 The Court has again been accused of
substituting its views of proper social policy for those of elected
legislatures. As presumptions became rebuttable, they also became less
predictable. Decisions were therefore attacked as ad hoc and
subjective.138 Despite not having a presumption, intermediate scrutiny
has been subject to the critique of subjectivity.139 Justice Rehnquist
initiated the critical dialogue in his dissent in Craig v. Boren, the case that
created intermediate scrutiny:
The Court’s [standard of review] apparently comes out of thin air. . . . How
is this Court to divine what objectives are important? How is it to determine
whether a particular law is “substantially” related to the achievement of
such objective, rather than related in some other way to its achievement?
Both of the phrases used are so diaphanous and elastic as to invite
subjective judicial preferences or prejudices relating to particular types of
legislation, masquerading as judgments whether such legislation is directed
at “important” objectives or, whether the relationship to those objectives is
“substantial” enough.140

The perceived inconsistencies in the Court’s civil rights cases have
inspired some commentators to suggest more than three levels of scrutiny
exist, with “rational relation with a bite” being the most popular.141 The
appearance of additional layers of scrutiny can be attributed to the
occasional satisfaction of both the compelling and rational relation
135. Although some commentators have argued that the Court should emphasize the “means”
portion of the test (especially if invalidating a statute) rather than the “purpose” part, this Article treats
both parts of the test as equal and subject to the appropriate presumption. See Bhagwat, supra note 3, at
319–27 (reasserting Gunther’s view that the Court should focus more on means and leave purpose to the
legislature); Goldberg, supra note 88, at 512.
136. See Fallon, supra note 6, at 1292.
137. See generally Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion? American Rights
Review and the Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797 (2011). See also Bhagwat, supra note 3, at
308, 319; Shaman, supra note 27, at 163–72.
138. See Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 308, 319.
139. See Fallon, supra note 6, at 1298–99.
140. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 220–21 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
141. See Raphael Holoszyc-Pimentel, Reconciling Rational Basis Review: When Does Rational
Basis Bite?, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070 (2015); Steven Menashi & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Rational Basis
with Economic Bite, 8 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 1055 (2014); Shaw, supra note 125, at 498–501.
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rebuttable presumptions.142 The tests are also clearly subjective in their
application. However, the judicial subjectivity evinced in the Court’s
opinions is grounded in an appropriate framework and consistent with a
more flexible concept of precedent.143 If judicial subjectivity is accepted,
three-tiered scrutiny with two rebuttable presumptions is a more accurate
description of the modern civil liberties test than any of the proposed
“additional tiers” alternatives.
III. CLASSIFICATIONS, RIGHTS, AND CONTENT: THE ENTRY TO SCRUTINY
By 1976, after the Court created the three tiered levels of scrutiny, the
inquiry then shifted toward the consideration of what factors should
determine the appropriate level of scrutiny in any given case.144 As
previously noted, the tests for equal protection, new substantive due
process, and free speech are the same. However, all three constitutional
doctrines have a different methodology for determining what level of
scrutiny applies in a particular case. Since the 1970s, the Court has been
reluctant to expand application of the highest level of scrutiny. The
modern Court has been much more willing to employ intermediate
scrutiny as the tool for balancing infringements on civil liberties. In fact,
some commentators have identified intermediate scrutiny as the Court’s
default position.145
A. Rights in Old Substantive Due Process
Natural law was the dominant legal philosophy during the lives of the
Founding Fathers and the adoption of the Constitution. A basic tenet of
that doctrine is that individual citizens possessed innumerable rights
against the government that were established or implied by the common
law. For example, the Declaration of Independence and the Ninth
Amendment reflect beliefs in natural law at the time.146
After the Supreme Court refused to define the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities Clause as imposing natural law

142. See Goldberg, supra note 88, at 489.
143. See infra notes 280, 288–294 and accompanying text.
144. Some commentators have suggested that, given the decades-long stability of the test, modern
civil rights litigation really focuses on the gateway determination of how to get heightened scrutiny. See
Barnett, supra note 7, at 1489; Fallon, supra note 6, at 1297.
145. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
146. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”); THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men . . . are endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”).
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obligations on the states,147 the Lochner era utilized the term “liberty” in
the Due Process Clause to accomplish that result. Old substantive due
process broadly defined the rights inherent in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s use of the term liberty. The Court in Meyer v. Nebraska
reflected the Lochner era’s prototypical definition of liberty:
Without doubt, [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint
but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men.148

Additionally, the Lochner era embraced economic rights (e.g., the right
to contract and an occupation) and social rights (e.g., the right to raise
children, marry, and acquire knowledge) as protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Laws passed under state police powers were subject to the
rational relation test whenever those laws infringed on the rights
contained in this broad definition of liberty. Meanwhile, economic rights
served as vehicles for invalidating federal and state laws that attempted to
regulate the economy and eventually end the Great Depression.149 The
Court from 1937 to 1973 accepted this same definition of rights as the
Lochner era but subjected them all to the deferential rational relation test.
B. Classifications in Equal Protection
The first period Court’s rejection of old substantive due process
dictated that heightened scrutiny would begin with the emergence of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Whereas old
substantive due process defined rights, equal protection evaluated
classifications. The modern compelling test is therefore rooted in the first
period Court’s attempt to eliminate discrimination based on race by
subjecting racial classification to a scrutiny more exacting than the
deferential standard.150 Palmore v. Sidoti, a case invalidating a racebased custody decision on equal protection grounds, is often credited as
the first equal protection case to use the terminology of the modern

147. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
148. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). See also Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the
Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (“[W]e think it entirely plain that the Act . .
. unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education
of children under their control.”).
149. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 105–106, 108 and accompanying text.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2022

21

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 3 [2022], Art. 2

800

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 90

“compelling/necessary to the accomplishment of” test.151 The Court has
consistently applied the highest level of equal protection scrutiny to
classifications based on race (including affirmative action) and national
origin.152
The Court has also identified certain “indicia of suspectness” which
might be used to give the highest level of protection to other
classifications.153 In Rodriguez, the Court echoed the Carolene Products
footnote by defining such indicia as a class that has been “saddled with
such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process.”154 In Murgia, the Court noted that a class of individuals over
age fifty “have not experienced a ‘history of purposeful unequal
treatment’ or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of
stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities.”155 In
Plyler v. Doe, the Court also noted that heightened scrutiny would only
be given to classes that were involuntary.156 Classifications that met these
criteria would be labeled “suspect” classifications and would be subjected
to the compelling/necessary to the accomplishment of test and the
occasionally rebuttable presumption of invalidity.157
The Court has interpreted these criteria narrowly since the 1970s. The
highest level of equal protection scrutiny is only given to classifications
based on race (including affirmative action),158 national origin,159 and
state restrictions based on alienage.160 Commentators have attacked the
Court for not expanding the suspect class category in decades.161 The
Court has been criticized particularly for not applying heightened scrutiny

151. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432–33 (1984).
152. See Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (“[E]qual protection
analysis requires strict scrutiny of a legislative classification only when the classification impermissibly
interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect
class.”).
153. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
154. Id.
155. Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
156. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982) (“We reject the claim that ‘illegal aliens’ are a
‘suspect class.’ . . . Unlike most of the classifications that we have recognized as suspect, entry into this
class, by virtue of entry into this country, is the product of voluntary action.”).
157. See Goldberg, supra note 88, at 485.
158. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
159. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
160. See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 227 (1984).
161. See Goldberg, supra note 88, at 485.
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to classifications based on wealth,162 gender,163 and age.164
Intermediate scrutiny is governed by the same indicia noted above for
suspect class status but with some complicating factors. Craig v. Boren
declared that classifications based on gender should not be subjected to
the compelling test in part because women are not a minority of the
population, but the Court reasoned that such classifications deserve more
than mere deferential scrutiny because women have been subjected to
restrictions based on stereotypical assumptions in the past.165
Classifications based on an individual’s status as an out-of-wedlock child
are also given intermediate scrutiny because the status is beyond the
individual’s control and bears no relation to the individual’s ability to
contribute to society.166 Plyler v. Doe granted intermediate scrutiny to
classifications that completely deprived undocumented children of an
education, because the children did not voluntarily choose their status,
and the law imposed a lifetime of hardships upon children who were not
responsible for their disabling status.167
Intermediate scrutiny is therefore applied in cases where the class has
some indicia of suspectness—not enough to warrant the highest level of
scrutiny but enough to deserve something more than deferential scrutiny.
Some commentators have suggested that, given the Court’s reluctance to
expand the number of classes that receive strict scrutiny, intermediate
scrutiny has emerged as the Court’s default equal protection analysis.168
Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke clarified the development of
the modern three-tiered system of scrutiny.169 The case involved an equal
protection challenge to the admissions policies of the medical school at
the University of California at Davis. The school reserved sixteen out of
one hundred positions in its entering class for members of defined
minority races.170 The school’s policy was based on race, but it
disadvantaged a majoritarian group to the advantage of particular

162. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The Court’s common lawbased perspective that poverty is a private matter and not the result of government action is similar to
Lochner’s approach to wealth. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 889.
163. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
164. See Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
165. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197–98. The Court later indicated that classifications based on “real”
gender differences would only receive deferential scrutiny. See Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma
Cty., 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981).
166. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
167. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982). See also supra note 156 and accompanying text.
168. See Bhagwat, supra note 112, at 785.
169. See Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
170. Id. at 275. On the 1974 application form, applicants were asked “whether they wished to be
considered as members of a ‘minority group,’ which the Medical School apparently viewed as ‘Blacks,’
‘Chicanos,’ ‘Asians,’ and ‘American Indians.’” Id. at 274.
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minority groups.171 Bakke therefore is the first case to decide the level of
scrutiny to be applied to affirmative action initiatives. Justice Powell,
writing for the majority, concluded that all racial classifications, including
those which could be labeled benign, must be declared suspect and
thereby subject to the strict scrutiny test.172 Although white applicants
did not possess any of the indicia of suspectness, the Court reasoned that
all racial classifications are inherently suspect.173 The Court noted that
even those intended to be benign could have the actual effect of
disadvantaging minority groups.174
Channeling Roe, Justice Powell concluded that three of the four
objectives which motivated the policy were not compelling,175 but the
fourth—“obtaining the educational benefits that flow from an ethnically
diverse student body”176—satisfied the compelling standard.177 Bakke
therefore reaffirmed that the presumption of invalidity in the compelling
test was occasionally rebuttable. However, the opinion noted that the
means chosen to implement this compelling objective were unnecessary
to accomplish the policy’s purpose. The Court considered that a holistic
admissions approach considering race as one of many factors would be a
necessary means, whereas the hard quota in the University of California’s
policy was not.178
Justice Brennan’s impassioned opinion argued that affirmative action
initiatives should be granted intermediate scrutiny.179 This lesser scrutiny
was appropriate because the disadvantaged white students possessed none
of the indicia of suspectness.180 The historic disadvantages placed on the
defined minorities mandated that the Court show leniency to legislatures
trying to remedy those past practices.181 The argument for intermediate
scrutiny, although often repeated by minority opinions in later cases,
never received a majority vote.182 The modern Court subjects all
171. See id.
172. See id. at 291 (“Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call
for the most exacting judicial examination.”).
173. See id.
174. See id. at 298.
175. See id. at 307–11. The three purported purposes that did not satisfy the test were “(i) reducing
the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools and in the medical profession;
(ii) countering the effects of societal discrimination; [and] (iii) increasing the number of physicians who
will practice in communities currently underserved . . . .” Id. at 306 (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
176. Id. at 306.
177. See id. at 311–12.
178. See id. at 318–19.
179. See id. at 356–62 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
180. See id. at 357.
181. See id. at 363–64.
182. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
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affirmative action initiatives to the compelling/necessary to the
accomplishment of test.183
Although considerable attention is given to the two classes of
heightened scrutiny, the vast majority of legislative classifications are
judged under the deferential rational basis standard. The Court’s
continuing anti-Lochner bias makes deferential scrutiny particularly
appropriate for classifications the Court perceives as “economic” in
nature.184 The Court has also applied deferential scrutiny to classifications
based on wealth185 and age,186 despite forceful dissents supporting
heightened scrutiny in both cases.187 However, the second period’s
deferential standard includes an occasionally rebuttable presumption of
validity.188 The Court has therefore infrequently invalidated legislation
even when applying the deferential standard.189 The Court is more likely
to invalidate laws under deferential review if the legislature has evinced
animus toward a particular class,190 such as individuals with disabilities191
or homosexual persons.192
The Court has also given suspect status to a limited group of rights that
emerged from the first period’s anti-Lochner bias. Under the Equal
Protection Clause, classifications that impinge on certain fundamental
rights in connection with discrimination based on wealth receive suspect

of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
183. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200 (1995).
184. See U.S. R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); City of New Orleans v. Dukes,
427 U.S. 297 (1976); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). But see Fritz, 449
U.S. at 197–98 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for being too deferential in applying
deferential scrutiny).
185. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
186. See Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
187. See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 319–24 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 62–63
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 97–100 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
188. This Article contends that the three-tiered system is better understood by focusing on the nature
of the presumption at hand rather than considering more than three levels of scrutiny. However, many
commentators have adopted the concept of “rational review with a bite” to explain the occasional
invalidation of legislation under the deferential standard. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
189. See Goldberg, supra note 88, at 512–13 (stating that the Court has invalidated legislation under
deferential scrutiny in approximately 10% of the cases between 1973 and 2004). Goldberg sees this
number as evidence of a fourth tier of scrutiny. See also Holoszyc-Pimentel, supra note 141, at 2071–72
(stating that the Court in equal protection cases has invalidated statutes under the rational relation test 17
times out of over 100 challenges—approximately 15%). This Article suggests that a rate of approximately
10%–15% is consistent with an occasionally rebuttable presumption.
190. See Klarman, supra note 13, at 217.
191. See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
192. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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class status.193 These cases involved laws which limited voting rights,194
access to the judicial system,195 and the right to interstate travel,196 all
based on wealth criterions. While this line of cases has never been
overruled, the protection of fundamental rights under equal protection has
not been expanded since 1973. In that year, Roe reinstituted the
methodology of new substantive due process. The expansion of
constitutional rights, therefore, shifted from equal protection and returned
to its proper home in the Due Process Clause. Fundamental rights being
decided in the equal protection context is best attributed to the first period
Court’s anti-Lochner bias. FDR appointees were not willing to revive
substantive due process, so they forced the concept of fundamental rights
into equal protection. The Roe decision properly returned the protection
of rights to new substantive due process. Also in that year, the Court in
Rodriguez refused to apply suspect class status to a claim concerning the
deprivation of the right to an education based on a wealth criterion.197
Given the priority placed on education in other decisions,198 the Court’s
unwillingness to include it as a fourth fundamental right signaled the end
of efforts to expand the fundamental rights list in the context of equal
protection.199 While never overruled, these cases are best viewed
historically as equal protection anomalies.
C. Rights Under New Substantive Due Process
The modern revitalization of new substantive due process actually has
its roots in a first period opinion, Griswold v. Connecticut.200 The case
involved two Connecticut statutes that made it illegal to use, or assist
others in using, contraceptives.201 The opinion was written by Justice
Douglas, an FDR appointee. He reveals early in the opinion his antipathy
to old substantive due process and Lochner:
[W]e are met with a wide range of questions that implicate the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Overtones of some
arguments suggest that [Lochner] should be our guide. But we decline that
invitation . . . . We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom,
193. See Fallon, supra note 6, at 1281–83.
194. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Virginia State
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
195. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
196. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
197. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 18–23.
198. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1955) (“[E]ducation is perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments.”).
199. See Klarman, supra note 13, at 264, 288–89.
200. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
201. Id. at 480.
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need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs,
or social conditions.202

The Court disavowed the old substantive due process and instead decided
the statutes conflicted with the penumbras of the Bill of Rights. The right
to privacy was found in these implications, and the statutes intruded on
the right by criminalizing the use of contraceptives by married couples.203
Douglas surprisingly reaffirmed the validity of the Court’s holdings in
Meyer and Pierce, the old substantive due process cases, but recast them
as First Amendment decisions.204
Justice Black, another FDR appointee, dissented from the opinion. He
dismissed Douglas’s penumbra analysis as a forced reading of the Bill of
Rights, which would ultimately dilute the explicit rights they were written
to protect.205 Black noted that the right to privacy was not explicitly found
in the Constitution, and its recognition by the Court was in fact based on
old substantive due process and natural law. He of course could not join
in such a holding:
If these formulas based on ‘natural justice,’ . . . are to prevail, they
require judges to determine what is or is not constitutional on the basis of
their own appraisal of what laws are unwise or unnecessary. The power to
make such decisions is of course that of a legislative body. . . . I do not
believe that we are granted [this] power . . . . The two [cases] they do cite
and quote from, [Meyer] and [Pierce], were both decided in opinions by
Mr. Justice McReynolds which elaborated the same natural law due
process philosophy found in [Lochner] . . . . I merely point out that the
reasoning stated in Meyer and Pierce was the same natural law due process
philosophy which many later opinions repudiated, and which I cannot
accept.206

Justice Harlan concurred in the opinion, embracing a revival of
substantive due process. He explicitly refuted Black’s criticism that due
process was too subjective:
In my view, the proper constitutional inquiry in this case is whether this
Connecticut statute infringes the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

202. Id. at 481–82.
203. See id. at 483 (“[T]he First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from
governmental intrusion.”). Although the penumbra analysis has been extensively written about in legal
commentary, penumbras were never used again by a majority opinion of the Court. Griswold is therefore
best seen as an expression of the first period’s anti-Lochner bias. See Fallon, supra note 6, at 1284.
204. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482–83. This fanciful interpretation of both cases only confirms the
extreme anti-Lochner bias of the FDR appointees. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
205. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 509 (Black, J., dissenting) (“One of the most effective ways of
diluting or expanding a constitutionally guaranteed right is to substitute for the crucial word or words of
a constitutional guarantee another word or words, more or less flexible and more or less restricted in
meaning.”).
206. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 511–16 (Black, J., dissenting).
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Amendment because the enactment violates basic values implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty . . . . The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment stands, in my opinion, on its own bottom. . . . Judicial selfrestraint . . . will be achieved . . . only by continual insistence upon respect
for the teachings of history, solid recognition of the basic values that
underlie our society, and wise appreciation of the great roles that the
doctrines of federalism and separation of powers have played in
establishing and preserving American freedoms. Adherence to these
principles will not, of course, obviate all constitutional differences of
opinion among judges, nor should it. Their continued recognition will,
however, go farther toward keeping most judges from roaming at large in
the constitutional field than will the interpolation into the Constitution of
an artificial and largely illusory restriction on the content of the Due
Process Clause.207

Harlan’s perspective that history would limit judicial subjectivity
eventually provided a crucial foundation for new substantive due process.
The Roe opinion was the death knell for penumbras. The Court
explicitly stated that substantive due process was the source for the right
to privacy. Further, the Court implied that henceforth, substantive due
process would be the constitutional analysis for protecting natural law
rights, which are not specifically mentioned in the Constitution. 208
However, the Court needed to create a “new” system to avoid a direct
reincarnation of Lochner. As noted above, the Roe opinion borrowed the
term “heightened scrutiny” from equal protection and created the
compelling/necessary to the accomplishment of test. The highest level of
scrutiny would not be given to all rights but only those deemed by the
Court to be “fundamental.”209 The term comes from Justice Harlan’s
concurrence in Griswold, as does its definition. Authoring the Roe
opinion, Justice Blackmun wrote:
These decisions make it clear that only personal rights that can be deemed
‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ [Palko], are
included in this guarantee of personal privacy. They also make it clear that
the right has some extension to activities relating to marriage, [Loving];

207. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500–02 (Harlan, J., concurring) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). Justice Goldberg’s concurrence was based on the Ninth Amendment. See Griswold, 381 U.S.
at 486–99 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Black trivialized that argument in his dissent. See Griswold,
381 U.S. at 518–21 (Black, J., dissenting). The Ninth Amendment has been effectively ignored by the
Court since Griswold. See BENNETT PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT (1955); Kurt T.
Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 597, 689 (2005) (“For the next
thirty years [following 1937], not a single invocation of either the Ninth or Tenth Amendments would be
successfully brought in any federal court.”); Seth Rokosky, Denied and Disparaged: Applying the
“Federalist” Ninth Amendment, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 275, 276–94 (2010); Tejshree Thapa, Expounding the
Constitution: Legal Fictions and the Ninth Amendment, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 139, 151–160 (1992).
208. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 168–71 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
209. See Barnett, supra note 7, at 1480.
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procreation, [Skinner];
contraception, [Baird];
family
relationships, [Prince]; and child rearing and education, [Pierce;
Meyer].210

The distinction between fundamental and mere rights would be decided
by a review of history, as envisioned by Justice Harlan. The Roe opinion
extensively surveys the history of abortion in Western Civilization to
justify its conclusion that the right to privacy encompasses a woman’s
decision of whether to terminate her pregnancy.211 Roe defined the
parameters of the highest level of scrutiny under new substantive due
process.212
The Court later reaffirmed the use of history to define which rights are
fundamental in Washington v. Glucksberg.213 The opinion also reflects
the fear that new substantive due process will be subjected to the antiLochner critique of judicial subjectivity:
Our established method of substantive-due-process analysis has two
primary features: First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process
Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are,
objectively, “deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,” and
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” such that “neither liberty nor
justice would exist if they were sacrificed[.]” Second, we have required in
substantive-due-process cases a “careful description” of the asserted
fundamental liberty interest. Our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and
practices thus provide the crucial “guideposts for responsible
decisionmaking,” that direct and restrain our exposition of the Due Process
Clause. . . . This approach tends to rein in the subjective elements that are
necessarily present in due-process judicial review.214

Roe therefore opened the door for the Court’s reconsideration of the
natural law conception of unenumerated constitutional rights. Many
rights were considered to be fundamental pursuant to natural law doctrine.
Once the Court expanded the number of fundamental rights, it invariably
exposed itself to judicial subjectivity critiques.215 The Court responded
by stating that U.S. history, legal traditions and values were “objective”
considerations that would restrain justices’ interpretation of fundamental
rights.216
210. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152–53 (majority opinion).
211. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 129–46.
212. See id. at 164–67. The Court tinkered later with access to the compelling test in the abortion
context. A plaintiff must now show that an allegedly invalid statute “unduly burdens” the fundamental
right of a woman to choose whether to bear or beget a child. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124
(2007); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
213. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
214. Id. at 720–22 (internal citations omitted).
215. See Barnett, supra note 7, at 1487.
216. See Fallon, supra note 6, at 1316–21.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2022

29

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 3 [2022], Art. 2

808

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 90

Intermediate scrutiny in new substantive due process has been less
developed than in equal protection and free speech. Moore v. City of East
Cleveland (which involved the right to extended family living),217
Youngberg v. Romeo (which involved the right to proper treatment in
involuntary confinement),218 and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t. of
Health (which involved the right of the unconscious to refuse medical
treatment)219 are best seen as providing protection for intermediate liberty
rights. History dictates that these rights are too important for the rational
relation test but not fundamental enough to warrant the compelling test.
Intermediate scrutiny is also a tool the Court has employed to develop
a consensus on rights that deserve more than deferential scrutiny. An
example of such a process is the use of intermediate scrutiny to expand
the right to privacy to include sexual orientation. Bowers v. Hardwick
first presented the Court with a challenge to a Georgia statute
criminalizing sodomy.220 The defendants argued that their homosexual
sex practices were protected under the Griswold and Roe definition of
privacy.221 The Hardwick opinion disagreed and asserted that the right of
privacy defined in previous cases was meant to protect marriage, child
rearing, contraceptives, and abortion: “Accepting the decisions in these
cases and the above description of them, we think it evident that none of
the rights announced in those cases bears any resemblance to the claimed
constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy that is
asserted in this case.”222
Lawrence v. Texas explicitly overruled Hardwick.223 The Texas statute
at issue in Lawrence criminalized “deviate sexual intercourse” and
included anal and oral sex within its definition of deviate.224 The Court
invalidated the statute but never described the right of privacy at issue as
fundamental or used the phrase “compelling purpose.” The opinion
focused mainly on the history of anti-sodomy statutes and the political
changes regarding sexual orientation post-Hardwick. The clearest
statement the Court makes is that “[t]hese references show an emerging
awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in
deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to
sex.”225 The opinion further defined the liberty interest as protecting

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
See Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (2003).
See id. at 190–91.
Id.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
See id. at 563.
Id. at 572 (emphasis added).
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“choices central to personal dignity and autonomy . . . .” 226 The Court
concluded by noting that the case did not present any issues involving
minors, coerced individuals, public conduct, prostitution, or same-sex
marriage.227 The Court was clearly worried about political backlash on
the issue of same-sex marriage.
United States v. Windsor invalidated the federal Defense of Marriage
Act (“DOMA”).228 The Court placed heavy emphasis on the states’
ability to control marriage. In this case, New York recognized the validity
of a marriage between plaintiff and her deceased same-sex partner.229
However, DOMA excluded the plaintiff from the definition of a surviving
spouse.230 Plaintiff therefore did not qualify for the marital exemption
under the federal estate tax.231 Plaintiff paid $363,053 in estate taxes,
which she would have avoided with the benefit of the DOMA
exemption.232 She then filed a suit asking for a refund based on the
invalidity of DOMA.233
The Court discussed in some detail whether the case involved new
substantive due process or equal protection.234 The Court noted that
Lawrence had relied on the substantive due process right of privacy to
invalidate the statute at issue there. However, the Court ultimately relied
on equal protection to invalidate DOMA.235 The Court examined the
congressional purpose behind its passage and determined that it
evidenced an animus to homosexuals.236 The Court invalidated the statute
by concluding that such directed hostility failed the rational relation
test.237 The power to degrade or demean was not a legitimate purpose of
government.238
Obergefell v. Hodges revealed a majority that was finally ready to

226. Id. at 574 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
227. See id. at 578.
228. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 775 (2013).
229. See id. at 769.
230. See id. at 752.
231. Id. at 753.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 764–75. This is a frequent occurrence in cases involving sexual orientation. An earlier
case invalidated a Colorado law on the basis of an equal protection violation. See Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996). The issue turns on whether the Court focuses on the homosexual person’s right
to privacy and autonomy, or focuses on the disparate treatment between heterosexual couples and
homosexual couples.
235. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 775.
236. Id. at 770–72.
237. Id. at 775.
238. See id. (“The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and
effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in
personhood and dignity.”).
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resolve the issue of same-sex marriage.239 Multiple cases were united by
the Court, all claiming a disadvantage because of a state law only
recognizing opposite-sex marriages.240 The opinion focused its analysis
on new substantive due process and the fundamental nature of the right to
marry. The Court reasoned that same-sex couples were entitled to the
same benefits of marriage as opposite-sex couples based on principles of
autonomy and personal dignity.241 The statutes at issue demeaned and
stigmatized same-sex couples.242 The majority tried to counter the
dissent’s objection—that the Court was usurping the legislative process—
by noting that individuals are not required to wait for legislative action
when existing statutes violate fundamental rights.243 The Court also
relied on equal protection concepts to bolster its conclusion that statutes
are invalid to the extent that they forbid same-sex couples from enjoying
the same right to marry as opposite-sex couples.244 However, the Court
never used the language of the compelling/necessary to the
accomplishment of test.
Justice Scalia’s dissent reflected the first period Court’s anti-Lochner
sentiment that the majority opinion was a clear usurpation of legislative
power.245 An unrepresentative majority of nine had, in his view, declared
itself to be a super legislature.246 Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent was even
more direct in espousing anti-Lochner bias.247 He repeated Scalia’s
usurpation argument and noted that the civil, rather than criminal, nature
of the statutes made their invalidation even more egregious.248 Roberts
even updated the famous line from Holmes’s dissent in Lochner to include
a reference to a progressive philosopher, stating: “the Fourteenth
Amendment does not enact John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty any more than
it enacts Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”249

239. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
240. See id. at 2593.
241. See id. at 2597–2600.
242. See id. at 2601–02.
243. See id. at 2605 (“The dynamic of our constitutional system is that individuals need not await
legislative action before asserting a fundamental right.”).
244. See id. at 2601 (“[B]y virtue of their exclusion from that institution, same-sex couples are
denied the constellation of benefits that the States have linked to marriage.”).
245. See id. at 2629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
246. See id. at 2629 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This is a naked judicial claim to legislative—
indeed, super-legislative—power; a claim fundamentally at odds with our system of government.”).
247. See id. at 2621 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“The Court was ‘asked’—and it agreed—to ‘adopt a
cautious approach’ to implying fundamental rights after the debacle of the Lochner era. Today, the
majority casts caution aside and revives the grave errors of that period.”).
248. See id. at 2620.
249. Id. at 2622. Justice Thomas dissented to note his disagreement with the revival of substantive
due process. See id. at 2631 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Alito’s dissent repeated the usurpation
critique. See id. at 2642–43 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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The Court’s rulings on homosexual rights therefore evolved in nineteen
years from describing the right to privacy as a mere liberty in Hardwick
to declaring it a fundamental right in Obergefell. In between, the Court
used intermediate scrutiny as a means of assessing its own and the
nation’s changing attitude toward homosexual rights, especially regarding
the politically sensitive issue of marriage. Obergefell’s refusal to use the
compelling test can be explained by its reliance on a finding of legislative
animus towards same-sex couples, as stated in Romer and Windsor.250
The animus purpose fails any test, including the deferential one.251 The
Court’s reflection of a growing political consensus regarding gay rights
stands in sharp contrast to the Lochner era Courts’ refusal to acknowledge
the political realities of the New Deal.252
Similar to classifications in equal protection, most of the liberty
interests that come before the Court are labeled mere rights and receive
the deferential rational relation test.253 New substantive due process still
reflects the first period’s anti-Lochner bias by confining all economic
rights (particularly the reviled rights to contract and have an occupation)
to the status of mere rights.254
D. Free Speech Rights
Free speech cases are difficult to organize. Free speech rights under
250. See id. at 2596–97 (majority opinion).
251. See Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 326; Fallon, supra note 6, at 1271; Goldberg, supra note 88, at
492.
252. See Friedman, supra note 3, at 1383–84 (discussing whether adherence to judicial norms or
public acceptance of the decision determines the Court’s legitimacy); Sunstein, supra note 5, at 906–07.
For the argument that the Court erred in considering political consensus in its opinions, see Obergefell,
135 S. Ct. at 2629–30 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 597–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
253. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (regarding the right to assisted
suicide); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (regarding the right to informational privacy); Kelley v.
Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976) (regarding a policeman’s right to appearance); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372
U.S. 726 (1963) (regarding the right to an occupation).
254. See, e.g., New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 106–07 (1978); Exxon
Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 124–25 (1978) (“Regardless of the ultimate economic efficacy
of the statute, we have no hesitancy in concluding that it bears a reasonable relation to the State’s
legitimate purpose in controlling the gasoline retail market, and we therefore reject appellants’ due process
claim.”). See also E. Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 537 (1998) (“[T]his Court has expressed concerns
about using the Due Process Clause to invalidate economic legislation.”); Concrete Pipe & Prod. v. Constr.
Laborers Pension Tr., 508 U.S. 602, 639 (1993) (“[U]nder the deferential standard of review applied in
substantive due process challenges to economic legislation there is no need for mathematical precision in
the fit between justification and means.”); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)
(“[L]egislative Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come to the Court with a
presumption of constitutionality, and that the burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to
establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way.”). Cf. Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 721 (2010) (“[W]e have held for many
years (logically or not) that the ‘liberties’ protected by substantive due process do not include economic
liberties.”).
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the First Amendment are given the same three-tiered scrutiny as
classifications and rights, but the determination of the appropriate levels
has developed differently. This Article focuses only on the government’s
direct regulation of speech (mainly on content) and the government’s
regulation of the media.255
1. Direct Regulation of Speech
This Article is less concerned with the nuances of regulating speech
and more focused on the adaption of the three-tiered scrutiny test to First
Amendment values. This Section is therefore not intended to be an
exhaustive analysis of modern rules for restricting speech. In fact, the
Court created the modern methodology for determining what speech is
protected by defining which speech is not protected. The First
Amendment generally protects opinion and advocacy but does not protect
incitement, conspiracy, nor unlawful conduct. Brandenburg v. Ohio held
that speech which evinces a clear and present danger of unlawful activity
was not protected by the First Amendment.256 Cohen v. California
declared fighting words non-protected.257 Obscenity as defined in Miller
v. California is also not protected.258 Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission declared that commercial speech,
which is false, misleading, or illegal, is not protected. 259 Finally, “true
threats” as delineated in Virginia v. Black are non-protected.260
The Court used the term “non-protected” to describe the test
appropriate for the conduct defined in these cases, but a more accurate

255. For a more detailed analysis of tiered scrutiny and the First Amendment, see Bhagwat, supra
note 112, at 783–802; Fallon, supra note 6, at 1278–81.
256. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (“[T]he constitutional guarantees of free
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action.”).
257. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (“This Court has also held that the States are
free to ban the simple use . . . of so-called ‘fighting words,’ those personally abusive epithets which, when
addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke
violent reaction.”). Fighting words must be “a direct personal insult” that is clearly “directed to the person
of the hearer.” Id.
258. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). Miller created a three-part test for obscenity: “(a)
whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’ would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Id. at 24 (internal citations
omitted). The Court also provided definitions of these concepts. See id. at 25–26.
259. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980).
260. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). “‘True threats’ encompass those statements
where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” Id.
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description of the test is “least protected.” Non-protected speech still
receives the deferential rational relation test. The five cases noted above
also narrowed the definition of these categories of speech in relation to
the definitions previously adopted by the Court.261 The Court subtly
created more protected speech by effectively limiting the scope of nonprotected speech. The Court in Cohen also broadened free speech by
noting that the government could not suppress speech because it disagreed
with its message, and proscribing “offensive” conduct may not even be a
legitimate governmental purpose.262
Intermediate scrutiny is also clearly defined in the context of free
speech. The heart of the test is still “important purpose/substantially
related,” but the Court adds an additional first and fourth part to the test.
The statute at issue must also be content neutral and provide ample
alternative channels of communication in order to satisfy intermediate
scrutiny.263 The content neutral criterion does not apply to commercial
speech, which is limited to intermediate scrutiny by Central Hudson
Gas.264 The four-part intermediate scrutiny test is most often applied to
time, place, and manner restrictions265 in a traditional public forum266 and
symbolic speech267 regulations.268
The highest level of protected speech is not as clearly defined as the
two lower levels. Political speech is clearly protected,269 and viewpoint
restrictions in any public forum are clearly prohibited.270 In a traditional
public forum, speaker identity and subject matter restrictions are also
prohibited.271 Government attempts to limit opinion on any subject are
arguably subject to the compelling interest test, no matter how offensive
the opinion may be.272 In Cohen, Justice Harlan wrote:

261. See supra notes 256–260 and accompanying text.
262. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25–26.
263. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
264. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564. See also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
265. See Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647–48 (1981).
266. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941). Traditional public forums include
streets, sidewalks, and parks.
267. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405–07 (1989).
268. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293–94 (1984), which noted that
the test for time, place, and manner restrictions was the same intermediate scrutiny as regulations on
symbolic speech. See also Bhagwat, supra note 112, at 784.
269. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1964).
270. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
271. See id. The public forum analysis detailed in Perry also has three tiers: traditional public forum
at compelling level, non-public forum at deferential rational relation test, and quasi-public forum at
intermediate scrutiny depending on how it is opened. See id. at 45–46.
272. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726, 745–47 (1978).
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The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a
society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to
remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion,
putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands
of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce
a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no
other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and
choice upon which our political system rests.273

If a government regulates based on the content of speech, the Court will
likely subject the restriction to the highest level of scrutiny if it does not
fit into any of the clearly defined limits of lower and intermediate
scrutiny.
2. Government Regulation of the Media
The more recent free speech cases have forced the Court to adapt its
analysis to the changes brought about by advances in technology. Even
today, the bulk of the Court’s First Amendment principles were crafted in
a world dominated by newspapers, radio, television, and street corner
messaging. Technological advances produced a dilemma concerning
how to best adapt those rules and values to constantly changing
developments in communications. The Court has generally dealt with this
issue by assessing the appropriate level of scrutiny for different media
forms.
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation established the principle that each form of
media is its own law.274 The Court has implemented this concept by
assigning media to one of the three levels of scrutiny. The criteria for
heightened protection are the extent of invasion of the home, accessibility
to minors, spectrum scarcity, and history of governmental control.275 The
governmental action at issue must only be a regulation, not a total ban.276
The Court first gave the highest level of protection to newspaper and
print media in Miami Herald Publishing Company v. Tornillo.277
Delivering the majority opinion, Justice Burger wrote:
[Government] compulsion to publish that which [newspaper editors
believe] should not be published is unconstitutional. A responsible press is
an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press responsibility is not mandated by

273. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24.
274. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748 (“We have long recognized that each medium of expression
presents special First Amendment problems.”).
275. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 738 n.2, 748–49; Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375–
77, 389–90 (1969).
276. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 744–45.
277. See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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the Constitution and like many other virtues it cannot be legislated. . . . The
Florida statute exacts a penalty on the basis of the content of a
newspaper.278

The highest level of protection was justified because the print media did
not invade the home, was not subject to spectrum scarcity or historical
governmental regulation, and its access to minors was limited by price.
The Court has used similar reasoning to apply the highest level of scrutiny
to government regulation of sexually explicit material on the internet,279
900 telephone calls,280 and premium cable channels.281
Intermediate scrutiny was applied to government regulation of certain
media that satisfied some, but not all, of the heightened scrutiny criteria.
Cable operators are not like print editors, in that they select channels to
deliver content to viewers rather than creating the content themselves. To
the Court, spectrum scarcity was less important because fiber optics
allowed cable operators to deliver hundreds of channels, but cable still
relied on telephone poles and other public right of ways for access to its
customers.282 The Court has also incorporated intermediate scrutiny into
the “secondary effects” test, which delineates the boundaries for real
property zoning laws to regulate sexually explicit material.283
Finally, the “on air” broadcast media of television and radio are subject
to the lowest level of scrutiny.284 Both traditional television and radio are
subject to the channel limitations of spectrum scarcity, invade the home,
are easily accessible to minors, and have a history of government
regulation since their creation.285 “On air” television and radio are
therefore subject to the most government regulation.

278. Id. at 256.
279. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868–69 (1997).
280. See Sable Commc’ns of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127–28 (1989).
281. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 814 (2000).
282. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 748 (1996)
(regarding regulation of sexually explicit material); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 644–
45 (1994) (discussing must-carry rules).
283. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50–52 (1986); Young v. Am. Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 69–73 (1976). The secondary effects test is essentially intermediate scrutiny
without the content neutral first requirement. The zoning laws at issue in both cases focused on the
sexually content of the businesses covered by the statutes. The secondary effects test has not been
extensively used outside the context of real property zoning since it is based on content. See Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (explaining that the secondary effects test cannot be used to justify limits
on protests outside a foreign embassy).
284. “On air” refers to broadcasts that send signals capable of being received by an antenna. Cable
television and satellite radio, for example, are not “on air.”
285. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748–49 (regulating sexually explicit monologue); Red Lion Broad.
Co., 395 U.S. at 395–401 (validating a “fairness doctrine” for television more extensive than the “right to
reply” statute invalidated in Miami Herald Pub. Co.).
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IV. IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL SUBJECTIVITY
The modern equal protection, new substantive due process, and free
speech methodologies are founded on the subjectivity of judges.286 All
of these methodologies provide for principled subjectivity, but it is
subjectivity, nonetheless. The weighing of legislative purpose in
satisfaction of a compelling or important standard is by nature judicial
balancing.287 The indicia of suspectness in equal protection, the
investigation into history in new substantive due process, and the nonprotected definitions in free speech all include a significant element of
subjectivity, but it is limited by the legal standards contained in the
tests.288 This Article contends that such subjectivity was inevitable once
the Court started protecting unenumerated rights, giving specific meaning
to general phrases such as equal protection and free speech and expanding
intermediate scrutiny.289 The necessity of subjectivity was further
enhanced by the Court’s statement that rights were not absolute290 and its
decision to change both presumptions from essentially irrebuttable to
rebuttable.291 Finally, subjectivity is inevitable in a democratic system
premised on the belief that executive and legislative action cannot be
inconsistent with constitutional rights and values.292
This Article further contends that the degree of subjectivity that is
inherent in the current legal status of all three doctrines is appropriate and
workable. The system is an effective combination of legal standards and
judicial discretion. The nearly fifty years of decisions under this analysis
provide an understandable framework for lower courts and litigants. The
current system also allows for a gradual integration of changing social
values, as evidenced by the Court’s expansion of homosexual rights. The
rigidity criticized in the two-tier system has been effectively eliminated
in the three-tier system.293
The resistance to judicial subjectivity was the product of FDR
appointees’ emotional anti-Lochner bias. Lochner was criticized as being

286. Three-tiered scrutiny is not found in the Constitution. The entire test is judicially developed.
See Fallon, supra note 6, at 1285.
287. See Beschle, supra note 3, at 384; Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 311; Mathews & Sweet, supra
note 137, at 806–07.
288. See Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 325; Fallon, supra note 6, at 1316–21; Mathews & Sweet, supra
note 137, at 801.
289. See Barnett, supra note 7, at 1498; Bhagwat, supra note 112, at 824–25 (acknowledging
judicial balancing in three-tier test but wanting it to be more principled).
290. See Beschle, supra note 3, at 387.
291. See Bhagwat, supra note 112, at 784, 786, 797; Mathews & Sweet, supra note 137, at 826.
292. See Beschle, supra note 3, at 384 (discussing that no explicit provision exists in the
Constitution for balancing individual rights against the social costs of enforcing that right).
293. See Jackson, supra note 6, at 3127.
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ad hoc, subjective, unprincipled, and usurping the legislative function.294
The same criticisms have been asserted against the modern three-tiered
scrutiny test.295 From 1791 into the 1930s, the Court would reverse lower
court errors on a more case-by-case basis.296 These decisions were
necessarily more subjective and ad hoc. The Judiciary Act of 1925
significantly expanded the Court’s discretionary certiorari review and
correspondingly reduced mandatory review. The Act and the Court’s
increasing caseload began the Court’s shift away from case-by-case
reversal of error toward broader policy decisions to guide lower courts.297
This trend merged with the FDR appointees’ abhorrence of Lochner to
produce an extreme antipathy to judicial subjectivity in the first period.
In fact, judicial subjectivity was an accepted fact of legal life at common
law and during the Court’s first 140 years.298 Judges have always made
law.299
The values of precedent, properly understood, are still preserved within
the subjective tiered scrutiny system. Anti-Lochner bias in the first period
led to an unusually strict and rigid interpretation of precedent by legal
process scholars.300 This proved just as unworkable as the two-tiered
system of effectively irrebuttable presumptions.301 An appropriate
emphasis on precedent should be more flexible.302 The Court in the
second period has been less sensitive to the criticisms of being subjective
and ad hoc in its decisions.303 The Court has recently reaffirmed the
factors that are considered in the reversal of precedent.304 Precedent as
294. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
295. See Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 319–21; Bhagwat, supra note 112, at 824; Goldberg, supra note
88, at 525; Mathews & Sweet, supra note 137, at 804.
296. See Fallon, supra note 6, at 1293.
297. See Grove, supra note 7, at 476.
298. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 157–59 (1988); Closius,
supra note 24, at 150.
299. See Beschle, supra note 3, at 402.
300. See Closius, supra note 24, at 145–46. A number of the Warren Court’s most notable decisions
overruled prior decisions. See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1411–12 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring). Many of those decisions were criticized by legal scholars as unprincipled. See Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31–35 (1959). See also
Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 8 (1971);
Michael Anthony Lawrence, Justice-As-Fairness as Judicial Guiding Principle: Remembering John
Rawls and the Warren Court, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 673, 717–19 (2016); David A. Strauss, The Common
Law Genius of the Warren Court, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 845, 847–48 (2007).
301. See Grove, supra note 7, at 487–91; Shaman, supra note 27, at 172 (discussing the dangers of
rigidity and inhibitions of analysis).
302. See Closius, supra note 24, at 152–54; Friedman, supra note 3, at 1383 (questioning whether
legitimacy is determined by adherence to judicial norms or public acceptance of the decision).
303. See Grove, supra note 7, at 476–87 (discussing the change in 1925 from history of case-bycase decisions and correcting lower courts to the development of broad doctrines intended to guide lower
courts). See also supra notes 214–216, 297–298 and accompanying text.
304. See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1405 (majority opinion) (“To balance these considerations, when it
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thus defined is properly a more flexible or elastic concept,305 especially
when the Court is interpreting the Constitution instead of a statute.306
The major criticisms of judicial subjectivity are, in the end,
unpersuasive. The criticism of judicial subjectivity is subjective in and of
itself. Much criticism of judicial subjectivity is rooted in disagreement
with the results of a particular case or line of cases.307 Neither
conservatives nor liberals are consistent in their criticism of subjectivity.
In the Lochner era, liberal progressives criticized a conservative Court for
being ad hoc and subjective. In the second period, conservatives
criticized a more liberal Court for being ad hoc and subjective.
Conservative justices are scathing critics of the Court’s subjectivity in the
context of abortion and homosexual rights but are criticized for
subjectivity by liberal Justices in Citizens United v. FEC308 and Bush v.
Gore.309 The criticism that a decision is subjective and ad hoc is
frequently employed as a tool for those who do not agree with the result.
Finally, some critics will simply disagree with the pace of an evolving
Court’s delineation of a constitutional right. The Court will seem more
subjective as the cases evolve to a final position.310
Judicial subjectivity does not usurp the legislative process. The
Constitution clearly envisions that Congress and state legislatures are
responsible for making law. However, every court since the early days of
American constitutional history has agreed that majority rule cannot
impinge on the rights granted to individuals by the Constitution.311 The
question of legislative prerogatives is therefore really a question of what
rights are granted by the Constitution. Once that universally accepted
revisits a precedent, this Court has traditionally considered ‘the quality of the decision’s reasoning; its
consistency with related decisions; legal developments since the decision; and reliance on the decision.’”).
See also Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1414 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) for a slightly different formulation of the
factors. The list of factors by Justice Kavanaugh notably adds “changed facts since the prior decision; the
workability of the precedent;” and “the age of the precedent.” Id. Prior cases should not be overruled
simply because a Justice believes it was wrongly decided. See id. (“A garden-variety error or
disagreement does not suffice to overrule. In the view of the Court that is considering whether to overrule,
the precedent must be egregiously wrong as a matter of law in order for the Court to overrule it.”).
305. See id.
306. See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1405 (majority opinion); Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1413 (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring).
307. See Goldberg, supra note 88, at 487 (criticizing giving suspect class status to affirmative action
statutes).
308. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 408–09 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
309. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128–29 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Although we may
never know with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this year’s Presidential election, the
identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation’s confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian
of the rule of law.”).
310. The cases in the areas of affirmative action, see supra notes 169–183 and accompanying text,
gay rights, see supra notes 220–252 and accompanying text, and gender discrimination, see supra notes
128–132, 165 and accompanying text, provide examples.
311. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177–78 (1803).
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premise is conceded, the power of the Court to define and declare the
parameters of constitutional rights becomes the most significant inquiry.
The Court will always usurp the majoritarian legislative process
whenever it declares constitutional rights. Brown v. Board of Education
was criticized for usurping the legislative process.312
The Court’s protection of civil liberties can often lead to an evolving
relationship between legislatures and the Court, even in its most
controversial subjects. The decisions expanding homosexual rights have
been criticized as legislative usurpation by emotional dissents, but the
opinions both cited and shaped legislative grants of rights. The abortion
decisions likewise reflect a decades-long give and take between the Court
and legislatures, despite criticisms of usurpation. The Court’s decision to
apply intermediate rather than strict scrutiny to gender discrimination,
while intensely criticized by liberals, has provided a framework for
judicial and legislative advancements in gender equality.
Judicial subjectivity is inherent in rebuttable presumptions. Once the
Court established that rights are not absolute, and that presumptions of
invalidity and validity should be transformed from effectively irrebuttable
to occasionally rebuttable, subjectivity in decision-making was
inevitable. The effectively irrebuttable presumption was created by FDR
appointees in the first period to insulate themselves from the critique of
subjectivity. However, that rigid two-tier system ultimately proved
unworkable. The changed presumptions, combined with the creation of
intermediate scrutiny, made the subjectivity of judicial balancing a
necessary part of the system.313
Many critics correctly state that the Court is frequently unwilling to
acknowledge the subjective nature of its decisions.314 This Article agrees
with this criticism. In the interests of judicial transparency, the Court
should admit its subjectivity. The Court is still sensitive to the antiLochner bias of the first period. The Court should complete the
maturation of its reaction to Lochner by simply acknowledging
subjectivity is inherent in its constitutional interpretation.
Finally, many proposed one-test alternatives to three-tiered scrutiny are
equally subjective.315 Many commentators have argued that the threetiered system should be abandoned in favor of a proportionality system,

312. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIARY: THE SUPREME COURT IN THE GOVERNMENTAL
PROCESS 80 (1965).
313. See Mathews & Sweet, supra note 137, at 853.
314. See Mathews & Sweet, supra note 137, at 837.
315. See Goldberg, supra note 88, at 492. Goldberg suggests one test with three inquiries: (1)
whether there is a “plausible, nonarbitrary” reason for the discrimination; (2) whether the statute is based
simply on “generalizations about a characteristic” that are not directly relevant to the regulatory context;
and (3) whether the statute evinces bias or hostility. Id. See also Shaman, supra note 27, at 173–82.
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which has been adopted by many other countries.316 Proportionality, in
effect, provides one test for all constitutional rights. This Article does not
perceive any significant benefits in refusing to acknowledge that some
rights are more constitutionally significant than others.317 A more
nuanced approach seems just as valuable as a unitary analysis. However,
the proportionality system is just as subjective and susceptible to the other
criticisms of the modern Court as three-tiered scrutiny.318
V. CONCLUSION
A strict interpretation of precedent can become a foolish consistency.
Reflexively applying the “ad hoc” criticism of the Lochner era to the
modern three-tiered scrutiny test epitomizes a rigid sense of precedent.
The fifty years of three-tiered scrutiny adjudication has grounded its
development in constitutional language and values. The heightened
scrutiny framework and the three-tiered test are clear and settled. As
noted above, the Court has even clarified the factors that guide it in
assessing whether to overrule prior decisions. The modern three-tiered
system is more flexible than the first period’s rigid two-tiered system, and
its results can be characterized as more “case-by-case” than its
predecessor. However, case-by-case is not necessarily ad hoc. A less
rigid system is still consistent with a respect for precedent.319
Justice Douglas,320 one of the most liberal Justices of the first period,
and Justice Scalia,321 one of the most conservative Justices of the second
period, both wrote that the Court does not sit as a “super legislature” to
overturn the policy decisions of another branch of government. Both
were wrong. When the Court defines the parameters of any constitutional
right, the Court is a super legislature—by definition, the Court is limiting
the extent of legislative authority.
The three-tier scrutiny test
acknowledges the constitutional value of separation of powers by
316. See Beschle, supra note 3, at 385–86; Jackson, supra note 6, at 3094; Mathews & Sweet, supra
note 137, at 799.
317. See Mathews & Sweet, supra note 137, at 810.
318. See Mathews & Sweet, supra note 137, at 800–03, 806–07.
319. Flexibility is noted as one of the significant benefits of proportionality, a system many
commentators favor over three-tiered scrutiny. See Jackson, supra note 6, at 3127–28; Mathews & Sweet,
supra note 137, at 801–03; Shaman, supra note 27, at 172–77.
320. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482 (“We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom,
need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions.”); DayBrite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952) (“Our recent decisions make plain that we do
not sit as a super-legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation nor to decide whether the policy which it
expresses offends the public welfare.”).
321. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2629 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This is a naked judicial claim to
legislative—indeed, super-legislative—power; a claim fundamentally at odds with our system of
government.”).
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subjecting the vast majority of classifications, rights, or conduct to the
deferential standard of review. However, for those classifications, rights,
or expressions that qualify for heightened scrutiny, the Court’s
functioning as a super legislature is constitutionally appropriate.
Americans today enjoy more civil rights than any other people in
history. That accomplishment is attributable in part to a complex
constitutional dance between legislatively created rights and judicially
created rights. The Constitution, as applied to a modern, technological
America, also requires a delicate balancing within the sphere of judicially
created rights to ensure appropriate deference to legislative
determinations. Three-tiered scrutiny, and the judicial subjectivity
inherent within it, embodies the appropriate respect for legislative values
upon which the modern protection of civil rights and separation of powers
depend.
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